Touchscreens, the dominant input type for mobile phones, require unique authentication solutions. Gesture passwords have been proposed as an alternative ubiquitous authentication technique. Prior security analysis has relied on inconsistent measurements such as mutual information or shoulder sur ng attacks. We present the rst approach for measuring the security of gestures with guessing attacks that model real-world attacker behavior. Our major contributions are: 1) a comprehensive analysis of the weak subspace for gesture passwords, 2) a method for enumerating the size of the full theoretical gesture password space, 3) a design of a novel guessing attack against user-chosen gestures using a dictionary, and 4) a brute-force attack used for benchmarking the performance of the guessing attack. Our dictionary attack, tested on newly collected user data, achieves a cracking rate of 47.71% after two weeks of computation using 10 9 guesses. This is a di erence of 35.78 percentage points compared to the 11.93% cracking rate of the brute-force attack. In conclusion, users are not taking full advantage of the large theoretical password space and instead choose their gesture passwords from weak subspaces. We urge for further work on addressing this challenge.
INTRODUCTION
Touchscreens are the dominant way to interact with new and emerging computing technologies, in particular mobile devices. This interaction method requires user-centric authentication techniques to deal with the usability constraints of mobile use. Unlocking methods need to answer competing requirements of mobile interaction [15, 20, 26] : lack of visual attention to the screen, frequent unlock attempts, and relatively short length of a session.
Gesture passwords are a recently proposed authentication method for mobile devices that is attracting interest due to their ability to satisfy these usability criteria [1, 2, 13, 30, 34, 37, [48] [49] [50] . A gesture in the context of this work, as well as previous work [34, 50] , is de ned as a series of two-dimensional lines drawn on the surface of a touchscreen with one or more ngers. This gesture is then encoded as a set of X and Y coordinates and compared to a template for authentication.
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This emerging method has been studied and found to have some advantages. Prior work has shown that gestures can be performed quickly -22% faster than text passwords [50] , their memorability is unique under multi-account interference [50] , they have a high amount of information content and complexity [34] , and biometric features are distinct enough between users of the same gesture to be used to uniquely identify users [30, 33, 37] . User choices for mobile authentication are often driven by personal preference and usability criteria rather than overt security concerns. For example: users prefer the Android Pattern Unlock over PINs because of personal comfort, despite being able to enter PINs faster [42] . This was concluded independently by users without consideration to security, of which Android Pattern Unlock has been shown to be weaker than a 3-digit PIN [38] . Users have expressed preferences towards using gesture passwords when presented with the option over other methods [30, 50] .
Gesture passwords share similarities to graphical passwords, which have been studied in detail over the past decade and have gained prominence with the Android Pattern Unlock. However, there are key di erences between gesture passwords and graphical passwords. Graphical passwords present a password as a sequence of prede ned points (e.g. Android Pattern Unlock [38] , Draw-A-Secret (DAS) [16] ), as an image (e.g. Story [11] ) or an area on the screen that permits user access through matching points (e.g. PassPoints [46] ). Authentication with graphical passwords resembles text-based passwords in that the challenge is a matching problem that allows for the password to be exactly reproduced. Unlike text and graphical passwords, gesture passwords are de ned as a recognition problem [10, 34] . A gesture password cannot be exactly matched: it must be identi ed despite not being input by the user the same way every time.
Although gesture passwords satisfy usability criteria and can be preferential to other unlocking methods, there are open questions about how secure gesture passwords are. Most security research on gesture passwords focuses on procedural changes to authentication systems, a simple example being increasing the number of features used in authentication. Direct studies of gesture security have used information theory [34, 50] , shoulder sur ng [2, 13, 33, 34] , or equal error rates [1, 2, 13, 30, 34, [48] [49] [50] between legitimate users and attackers trying to emulate the gesture. The threat model in these scenarios is an attacker performing an observation of the gesture and trying to repeat it.
Another method, unexplored so far with gestures, is automated password guessing. This method is known as password cracking. The best method for modeling cracking behavior is guessability, a metric that quanti es a given password's security by counting how many guesses it takes an attacker to crack it [17, 38, 43, 44] . This metric is useful chie y for the reason that it maps to attacker behavior better than idealized, theoretical techniques [39] . Guessability has been popularly employed to measure the security of text passwords, but not gesture passwords. For text passwords, many studies have shown that user password choice is not random but rather falls into a concentrated subset [5, 6, 14, 23] . Attackers use leaked dictionaries to perform guessing attacks, wherein attackers rank passwords from most likely to least likely and guess passwords in this order. This concentrated subset is referred to as the weak subspace since it is the weakest portion of the password set at resisting cracking attempts.
No published work on gesture security has discussed how resistant these passwords are to automated guessing attacks. We are considering a threat model where an attacker can perform multiple guesses quickly at a terminal without being locked out by the device. This is not uncommon, for example, persistent security aws in the hardware of mobile devices can still allow for the auto-lock to be bypassed, as what happened for the iPhone [7] . There is also the attack scenario where the encrypted password data is leaked from the device, also bypassing the auto-lock. The main reason these types of attacks have not been done is because of the di culty involved in automating an attack strategy against the recognition problem for gesture passwords. Another problem for gesture guessability is that there are no leaked gesture passwords to form a dictionary that can be ranked by probability of appearance.
Guessability has also not been applied to gesture passwords because the recognition problem is more computationally expensive and time consuming compared to the matching problem. Matching problems are quickly checked -the attacker tries text password 'abcd' and moves on to '1234' when 'abcd' does not work. Recognition problems require an attacker to implement an additional step in their guessing attack -the attacker assumes the gesture password is a circle, and generates N slightly di erent circle trials before moving on to assuming the gesture password is a triangle and creating N attempts at that. The extra step is generating the N attempts per guess, which vastly slows down cracking.
Another issue a ecting guessing attacks is that the recognition problem is dependent on the recognizer, of which considerable work has been done in implementing such gesture recognizers [10] for various environments. Gesture recognizers perform mathematical transformations on raw gesture coordinate data in order to standardize the input and to recognize it -these transformations can a ect how guessing attacks are done. We chose Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) as our recognizer in this paper. We selected this recognizer because most gesture password studies and implementations [1, 2, 13, 30, 48, 49] use it. This does not limit our analysis -we derive a methodology based on using DTW as the similarity measure. This can be extended to virtually all recognition algorithms since most require a similarity step at some point (e.g. LCS, Cosine, Edit or Euclidean Distance).
Enumerating the size of the full space, the weak subspace, and being able to assign guessability values for a gesture password is valuable because it allows -uniquely -for direct numeric comparisons of security between gesture passwords and text passwords. Other metrics, such as Equal Error Rates, are often dataset dependent and are not applicable to the matching problem. This numeric metric allows for authors working on changes to gesture security systems to compare results and ndings between each other as well. Usable gesture security work can use these methods to warrant claims about how modi cations to human behavior, such introducing password policies, a ects the security of gesture passwords.
In this paper, we present the rst work on analyzing the guessability of gesture passwords. The major contributions are as follows:
Based on the largest set of gesture passwords ever assembled in research, we present a comprehensive analysis on the weak subspace for gesture passwords. An analysis of previous work [50] revealed a user bias towards choosing shapes and letters as gesture passwords. Extending this idea, we explore the weak subspace for gesture passwords revolving around collections of gestures with common meanings. By analyzing 529 gestures from previous studies [34, 50] , we identi ed 407 gestures that were selected by users because there is some cultural or social meaning behind them. We identify and split the weak subspace into seven groups among these gestures: digits, letters, geometric shapes, special characters, mathematical symbols, music symbols, and mathematical functions. No paper we have identi ed in the literature on gesture passwords explores this.
We used the weak subspace to build a novel dictionary attack method against gesture passwords. Using the seven weak subspace groups we identi ed, we constructed likely gestures an attacker might try based on how often a given gesture appears in the datasets we collected. To the best of our knowledge, this paper presents the rst dictionary attack method for recognition-based authentication.
We developed a brute force attack using symmetry. In addition to a dictionary attack, we provide a symmetry-based brute force attack with ideas rooted in a DAS attack [36] but updated and implemented for gesture passwords. We use this as a benchmark to demonstrate the e ectiveness of the dictionary attack and show that our dictionary attack can crack 35.78 percentage points more gestures than the brute force method on a new dataset from 109 participants, collected for this study.
We developed a novel method to analyze the full theoretical password space of gesture passwords and estimate the size of the weak subspace for gesture passwords. The size of the password space refers to how many di erent passwords are possible. The challenge here for gesture authentication is the recognition problem. We contribute a key insight that the gesture recognizer limits the very large gesture password space down to a smaller number of discrete possibilities. We contribute a concise methodology for how to approximate the size of this space as a function of two types of preprocessing methods and reasonable parameter choices. We estimated the weak subspace sizes for gestures to be 82.1 bits and 81.7 bits, depending on the orientation preprocessing method selected for the gesture recognizer.
To put our work in context, we present related work for: studies on gesture authentication, studies on password guessability for text passwords and graphical passwords, and conclude with a review of the existing methods for attacks against gesture authentication systems.
Gesture Authentication: Gesture passwords that rely on user-chosen secrets form the basis of our work. Although gesture-based authentication systems can be implemented in various ways [10] , the research community [1, 2, 37, 48, 49] has mostly focused on implementing recognizers with Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) [24] . We note that most of these works omit the details how gestures were preprocessed, an important point in our work because preprocessing methods change the size of the password space for gestures. Free-form gestures are also used in a system based on cosine similarity [34, 50] . Other work uses a combination of pre-de ned gesture strokes on the back of the device as a password [13] .
Other gesture systems focus on pre-de ned gesture sequences that derive security from behavioral biometric features rather than a secret. One system examined the feasibility of pre-de ned multitouch gesture and found that the uniqueness of biometric features, like hand size and nger length, can be used for authentication [30] . Similarly, implicit patterns on how people unlock their devices could be used for authentication [12] . Importantly, both of these previous approaches also use DTW as recognition method. GEAT [33] authenticates users based on nger velocity, device acceleration and stroke time.
Password Guessability: Text-based password guessability is a well-studied problem that derives its roots from biases in the user-chosen distribution of passwords. Early work examined 3289 text passwords and found that 86% of the passwords had structural overlaps: short in length, only contained lowercase letters or digits, and were common dictionary words [23] . A large-scale study on web passwords judged user passwords to be of poor quality and revealed overlap in user passwords across multiple accounts [14] . To combat the weakness of entropy, guessing entropy has been proposed to model the practical attacker behavior and quantify password security [6] . An analysis of 70 million passwords shows a clear bias in user-chosen distribution of text passwords [5] . An analysis of popular text password cracking methods reveals that quantifying password strength with a single cracking algorithm is not reliable [39] . Recently, a neural network model of human-chosen passwords was proposed, which resulted in an e cient and highly compressed password guessing method [22] . An password strength estimator -zxcvbn -can estimate the current best-known attacks with 1.5 MB compressed data and up to 10 5 guesses [45] .
There is also work on the guessability of graphical passwords. With Draw-A-Secret (DAS) [16] , people were found more likely to select symmetric graphics as passwords, reducing the size of the e ective password space [40] . This was the rst work to push forward the idea that the size of the graphical password space can be demonstrably reduced. Android's Pattern Unlock, which is a special case of DAS, was shown to skew the user-chosen distribution based on starting points and crossing patterns [38] . Instead of grid cells, Pass-Go [35] used intersections on a grid as anchors, with a study showing that 40% of users chose vertically or horizontally symmetric passwords and that 49% of the passwords are alphanumeric or well-known symbols [35] .
Besides recall-based schemes, graphical passwords based on human ability to recognize images, also have weak subspaces based on user choice. Passfaces [8] presents a panel of human faces and a user creates a password by clicking a sequence of images. A eld study on it showed that users tend to select the faces of their own race and the weakest 25% of user passwords were cracked in 13 attempts [11] . Instead of using human faces, Story [11] o ers the user a panel of generic images to select as their password. Although the user choice issue is less severe than Passfaces, there is still a selection preference between genders and the weakest 25% passwords were guessed in 112 attempts [11] . PassPoints [46] is a cued-recall graphical password or click-based graphical password [4] , with the major weaknesses being hotspots [41] and patterns [9] . Hotspots are the image areas or points that users are more likely to choose and the latest attacks based on them using Markov models can crack 36% of the PassPoints passwords by 2 31 guesses. [41] . Patterns are simple shapes that are likely to be chosen as PassPoints passwords: around 80% of PassPoints passwords fall into primarily de ned simple shapes [9] .
Based on these prior works in text passwords and graphical passwords, we can assume that the user-chosen distribution of gesture passwords could be similarly skewed. However, it has yet to be shown systematically.
Attacks Against Gesture Authentication: So far in the literature, attacks against gesture authentication have been performed by participants trying to emulate gestures based on a variable amount of knowledge about the gesture provided by researchers [1, 2, 34, 37, 48, 49] . These types of attacks are generally referred to as shoulder sur ng attacks. Smudge attacks [3] were used on touchscreens to identify user passwords based on oil patterns left by their ngers. There is also a robot-based attack [32] against an touchscreen pattern authentication scheme [12] , where the robot is able to emulate human patterns of use on touchscreens. However, this robot attack does not provide guessing attacks against human-chosen secrets such as gesture passwords.
In summary: there is no analysis of the e ects of preprocessing methods on the size of the gesture password space. Our work explains the e ects of preprocessing steps on the size of the password space. We provide a method to evaluate the security of gesture passwords through enumerating the theoretical password space. Considerable work has shown weak subspaces for text and graphical passwords, but we are the rst to demonstrate the weak subspace for gesture passwords. Security of gesture passwords has been measured with mutual information and equal error rates. We provide a method more closely aligned with real world attacker behavior through guessing attacks. We present an e cient dictionary attack method as well as a brute-force method for attacking, neither of which has been demonstrated in prior work on gesture passwords.
METHOD
In this section, we introduce gesture datasets used in our analysis. Then, we present a generalized procedure for gesture recognition based on DTW. We propose a method for estimating the sizes of full and weak subspaces of gesture passwords. Finally, we present our algorithms for performing dictionary and brute force attacks.
Data Acquisition and Classification
E ective guessing attacks require data about user choices. The most common gesture passwords that users select represent the best options to try. Before building the machinery required to perform guessing attacks, we rst need a set of data to derive insights from. A sample set is required for the attacker to use when attacking, and a test set is needed to evaluate the e ciency of our attack algorithms.
We aggregated two sets of data for these purposes. We labeled the sample set from which we derive our dictionary as the Dictionary dataset: it is composed of three gesture datasets, obtained from previous work on gesture passwords [34, 50] . It was collected from 232 users. The testing set, which we run our attack algorithms on, is called the Test dataset. It is composed of two datasets of gestures that we have newly obtained from 109 volunteer participants.
3.1.1 Dictionary Dataset. Previous work on user-generated gesture passwords classi ed created gestures into six rudimentary groups: Digit, Shape, Lines, Letter, Symbol, and Words [50] . We de ne our groups as:
• Digit: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9;
• Geometric Shape: triangles, circles, cylinders, etc.;
• Letter: upper and lower case of 26 letters; • Mathematical Function: basic signal functions.
• Mathematical Symbol: characters used in mathematics;
• Music Symbol: treble clef, simple notes, etc; • Special character: keyboard special characters. In our analysis, we merged the Lines and Shape groups into the Geometric Shape group. We then extended the Symbol group by breaking it into speci c meanings for four new groups: Math function, Math symbol, Music symbol, and Special character. We opted to remove the Word group because, after aggregating all the di erent datasets, we concluded that it does not appear as frequently as posited in prior work [50] .
In the Dictionary dataset, we found 407 out of 529 gestures as ones that were created by the participants because they have some semantic meaning. These gestures, that we hypothesize are chosen because of their meaning, are what we de ne to be the weak subspace of gestures. In addition to these gestures, there were 122 gestures in the Dictionary dataset and 90 gestures in Test dataset (General) that were not part of any of the seven groups. Since these gestures do not have obvious meanings or is not obvious whether they would be reused by other people based on our data, these gestures did not receive any speci c treatment.
Test Dataset.
We conducted a user study to collect the Test dataset. The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Rutgers University. The experiment consisted of collecting two datasets: Test dataset (General) and Test dataset (Weak).
Data Collection. The Test dataset (General) is used to test the e ciency of the guessing attack. We asked participants to create gesture passwords for a user account without any instruction as to what to choose. We asked each participant to create one unistroke gesture and one multistroke gesture. Table 1 shows that we collected 109 unistroke and 109 multistroke gestures from the participants. 136 of the user-generated passwords (78 unistroke and 58 multistroke) fall into the weak subspace groups identi ed in Section 3.1.1 above.
The Test dataset (Weak) is used to tune the performance of the attacking algorithm. Our guessing attack needs information about the most common variations a human might add when performing a gesture password. Our guessing attack needs to create N trials of a single gesture with only slight di erences between subsequent attempts -an example would be creating a rectangle of slightly longer width each time for 100 tries. The attacking algorithm needs an idea of when to stop making adjustments to a gesture beyond a point that humans do not do -in the rectangle example, this might be making the rectangle the full width of the screen. This means we need a large number of samples to determine parameters for the variable ways people draw a given gesture in each one of the groups in Section 3.1.1. We collected Test dataset (Weak) to meet this purpose. The weak subspace contains 84 speci c gestures, we asked participants to give us trials of 30 out of the 84 gestures. Totally, we collected 3270 gestures in Test dataset (Weak).
To mimic typical password creation tasks, we asked participants to rst create a gesture password and then recreate it to con rm it.
Participants. We recruited participants with yers on our university campus. We required the participants to be 18 years old or over and familiar with touchscreen devices. We recruited 109 participants with ages ranging 
External Validity.
The di erent sizes of the Dictionary dataset and the Test dataset (General) might a ect how commonly a weak subspace group appears. This could be a problem if this were true because it would a ect the generalizability of our analysis -it is possible that at very di erent sizes of datasets that one or more of the seven groups could be over or underrepresented in our data. At the very least, it can a ect the ability to draw valid comparisons between the Dictionary and Test (General) datasets. We computed the relative frequencies of the seven groups of weak subspace gestures in both the Dictionary dataset and Test dataset (General). The relative frequencies of one group of weak subspace gestures are calculated as in Eq.(1).
Relative frequency of group = # o f weak roup # o f entire weak subspace
(1) Table 2 shows that the relative frequencies of the Test dataset (General) are close to that of the Dictionary dataset despite a di erent sample size and di erent participants over separate studies. We can conclude that we are targeting similar distributions of gesture groups here and that they are suitable dictionary and attack targets, separately. We can conclude that the Test dataset (General) is a good attack candidate for the Dictionary dataset.
We are careful to note that the demographic breakdown of the Dictionary set and the Training set is preferential to people who work on campuses and college students. This a ects our ability to make strong statements about how representative these group categories are when applied to the general population. It is possible that age, education, or nationality can be factors that a ect the size of each gesture group. This is work that would have to be considered in the future that can be easily performed using the attack methodologies outlined by our work.
Gesture Recognition Approach
In this section, we will present the gesture recognition approach used in our analysis. First, we introduce the preprocessing procedures and its e ects on the full space. Then, we will introduce Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) as the recognition method.
Preprocessing.
People cannot exactly draw the same gestures on a touchscreen. To improve recognition accuracy, various preprocessing methods are often used to prevent relative (minor) di erences between two gestures from obfuscating how similar the gestures are. The purpose of our work is to analyze the independent e ect of preprocessing steps. Therefore, we want to analyze as many processing steps as possible. These independent preprocessing steps can be added or removed based on design requirements. In summary, our analysis Resampling: the gesture is resampled to a fixed number of sample points. Location Invariance: the gesture is translated to the origin point. Orientation Invariance: the gesture is rotated to the same direction. Scale Invariance: the gesture is scaled to the normal size.
on preprocessing methods is applicable to approaches that measure the similarity between time series. Figure 1 shows a generic preprocessing procedure. There are ve steps: 1) Stroke connection; 2) Resampling; 3) Location invariance; 4) Rotation invariance; 5) Scale invariance.
Stroke Connection. Unistroke gestures, which consist of a single continuous stroke to draw (for example, the number '8'), are easy for recognition algorithms to handle -it is a single sequence of (x,y) data coordinates. Most, if not all recognition algorithms, work best on this type of data. Multistroke gestures, which require more than one stroke to draw (for example, a # symbol), can complicate the recognition problem. These gestures are represented as multiple, separate pairs of coordinates in the Dictionary dataset. Using most recognition algorithms on these as-is would require matching every sequence exactly. This can lead to increased computation since there are M! combinations to consider, where M is the number of strokes. To simplify this problem, we connect gesture strokes end-to-end as displayed in Figure 1 . This transforms a multistroke gesture into a single stroke gesture and now only requires a single run of the recognition algorithm, reducing M! combinations down to 1. However, if a user draws the multistroke gesture in the wrong order, this is considered to be incorrect. The e ect of stroke connection is that the gestures can only have one continuous trace.
Resampling. Gestures that are sampled from the touchscreen all have coordinate sequences that are of variable length. This is a function of the sampling rate and the speed by which the user enters the gesture. Resampling gestures to a constant value removes variation and simpli es analysis. The question is, then, what is the best resampling rate to use in our analysis? The Resampling step of Figure 1 shows an illustrative example of this process. By examining the e ect of di erent resampling rates (R=2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128) on the Equal Error Rate (EER) in the Dictionary dataset, we found that after R = 16, the EER values are both low and stable. We use EER to evaluate whether the parameter values have an impact on recognition accuracy. We do not use it to determine or optimize the best values based on speci c datasets. The selection of suitable parameter values can signi cantly in uence recognition performance. For example, if R is too small, information contained in a circle will be lost and may become indistinguishable from a square. The e ect of resampling is that the number of sample points is xed to 16 and sequences with other lengths will not be considered. Location Invariance. When a user draws a gesture on the screen, they rarely draw it at exactly the same position every time. The solution to this is to make the gesture location invariant by translating the centroid of each gesture to the origin (0,0) point of a Cartesian coordinate system. The Location invariance step in Figure 1 gives an example of this. The e ect of location invariance is that the centroid is kept constant at the origin.
Orientation Invariance. Users do not draw their gestures at the same orientation every time -the centroid of the gesture may be rotated slightly o center. The solution to this problem is to make the orientation invariant. There are two methods used in literature for removing orientation variance. The upper and lower diagrams for Orientation Invariance in Figure 1 shows examples of these two methods.
Method I: Rotate the gesture until the direction vector, directed from the rst point to the last point, is parallel with the x-axis. Method II: Rotate the gesture until the direction vector, directed from the centroid to the rst point, is parallel with the x-axis [47] . A di erence between the two methods is that only the rst and last points of gesture are involved in rotating the gesture in Method I whereas all the gesture points are involved in rotating the gesture in Method II. This could lead to a di erence when it comes to resisting attacks, and therefore needs to be studied in detail.
Scale Invariance. Users rarely draw their gestures in the same size every time. As in prior steps, the solution is: Scale invariance, as shown in Figure 1 , divides the gesture sequence by the range (the di erence between minimum and maximum) of the gesture's X and Y coordinates for each respective coordinate pair [34, 50] . The e ect of scale invariance is that the gesture is bounded in a square (−0.5, 0.5).
Recognition Method: Dynamic Time
Warping. This section brie y introduces Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) [24] , which is used as our gesture recognition algorithm. We then describe the Sakoe-Chiba Band [31] for speeding up DTW calculations. We note again that we chose to use DTW as the recognizer since the community has opted to use that for several systems [1, 2, 12, 30, 37, 48, 49] .
Implementation of DTW. Dynamic Time Warping [24] is used to measure the similarity between the 1-D sequences of two gestures: Q = q 1 , q 2 , ..., q i , ..., q n and C = c 1 , c 2 , ..., c i , ..., c m . Speci cally, we construct a n − b − m distance matrix D with an element d i j = ||q i − c j ||. DTW nds the non-decreasing path in D, starting from d 11 and ending at d mn , which has the minimum total value along this path. The left part of Figure 2 shows an example of the dynamic matching path between Q and C. Since the classic DTW algorithm dynamically searches the target matching path in the n − b − m matrix, its computation cost is O(nm).
Sakoe-Chiba Band. DTW needs considerable computation. We can improve on this with the Sakoe-Chiba band [31] . This is a known global constraint region for calculating the DTW similarity between two sequences. The idea of the band is to generate an envelope boundary for the underlying sequence. The envelope is wider when the underlying candidate sequence is changing rapidly, and narrower when the query sequence plateaus [18] . Speci cally, the upper and lower bands are Figure 2 shows an illustration of this. If another sequence Q does not fall into the Sakoe-Chiba band of C, the system determines Q is not similar to C. This allows us to shrink the search space to a more manageable size. A key issue is the proper selection of r , the number of points looked forward and backward of a given point. We set r equal to 10% of the sequence length, based on a review [28] of more than 500 papers on DTW.
Full Space Analysis
The full space refers to the total number of distinguishable gesture possibilities that can be di erentiated by a gesture recognizer. Computing the full space for matching problems is easy, for example, there are 10 4 possible Fig. 2 . An illustration of the DTW algorithm and the Sakoe-Chiba band based on one dimension of our gesture data. The le figure shows how to dynamically search along the matching path in the grid. The top right figure displays how, according to the le matching path, the points in Q map to points in C. The bo om right figure displays the Sakoe-Chiba band using the broken line; U and L refer to the upper and lower envelopes, respectively. The envelope is wider when sequence changes and narrower when it plateaus.
combinations of 4-digit PINs. This represents all the PINs from 0000 to 9999. However, with gestures counting is more di cult. Two gestures are technically di erent if even one coordinate pair is not the same. The coordinate values are real numbers with decimal places, which means that there is an extremely large, near uncountable amount of gestures that are di erent if you modify even one coordinate point slightly. In this section, we present the additional processing steps on raw gestures to estimate the number of all possible gestures.
Gesture Discretization.
The key is to acknowledge that a gesture recognizer does not consider two gestures that have almost all the same points to be di erent. For example, the di erence could be that just one x-coordinate pair di ers by 0.1. A recognizer will state that the similarity of those two gestures is high, therefore it is likely they are the same gesture. The question becomes, what is the largest di erence between two coordinate pairs before two gestures might be considered to be di erent?
A gesture coordinate pair can take on a continuous value between two sample points. This is displayed in Figure 3(a) , where the red-line represents a continuous connection between the points. Gesture discretization imposes a rule on the gesture values: gesture values cannot vary continuously, they must vary by a xed amount. If gestures vary by a xed amount between points, then they become countable. The rst step is to gure out the Discretization Level, N , which is the number of discrete values that are possible between two gesture points.
Discretization Level. We need a discrete, countable number of values between two gesture points to be able to enumerate the space. To do this, we can subdivide the range between two coordinate points into N units. This means there are N possible values between two gesture points when counting all possible gestures as opposed to the large, near-in nite number of points when the gesture remains continuous. N should be the smallest possible value while still keeping two distinct gestures -like a circle and a square -from being counted as the same gesture. To achieve a reference for N , we examine the values of N (from 5 to 40 in steps of 5) based on the EER in Dictionary dataset, as we did when determining the resampling rate R. We chose N = 15 units since it is a local minima for error rates. We note that N = 15 units is not the optimal value for any particular gesture but optimal for the dataset as a whole. Figure 3(a) shows an example of this, imposing countable units. The e ect of discretization of variations is that it limits the options of samples in gesture variations to N discrete values.
Jump Limit. We have imposed a set number of values a gesture can take between sampled points when counting. However, there is a question about how large can a gesture value change? Figure 3 shows that, after gesture discretization, the adjacent discretized gesture points should not be too large. We require a semblance of continuity in order to preserve the shape of the gesture, otherwise a circle turns into a square. For example, if one sample point is at the maximum end of the value range, its adjacent sample points is unlikely to be at the minimum end of the value range. If this is not controlled then many details between the two points are lost and the gesture cannot be distinguished.
The Jump Limit, de nes the maximum possible di erence between two adjacent gesture points. With resampling rate R = 16 and discretization level N = 15 units, we examined all the gaps between adjacent points in all the gestures in the Dictionary dataset. We found the largest gap is 12 units. Therefore, we set = 12 units. The Jump Limit restricts that adjacent points of gesture variations must be less than the Jump Limit.
In summary, the size of the full gesture space is preprocessing-dependent and recognizer-independent. In the whole procedure to convert a raw gesture to a processed gesture in the full password space, the DTW recognizer is used to nd reasonable reference values for the resampling rate and the discretization level. The reference values cannot be optimized based on any particular recognizers or databases. Therefore, those reference values can also be applied to other recognizers that measure the similarity between time sequences, such as, Longest Common Subsequences (LCS), Edit Distance, Cosine Distance, and Euclidean Distance.
Enumeration of Full Space.
We introduced the procedures to transform a raw gesture to a preprocessed gesture that can be used in the recognizer and consequently as part of an authentication system. In this section, we apply the e ects introduced in the preprocessing and discretization steps to a function for enumerating the full space shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 GNume() is used to enumerate the full space with a speci c resampling rate, discretization level, jump limit and orientation invariance method. We enumerate gesture sequences from the last point to the rst point. First, we initialize the size of the full space FS = 0, the length of gesture L = R and the sum of visited points in X and Y, X sum = Y sum = 0. Then, we nd all of the possible values for the gesture's last points, X e and Y e . Since the gesture is discretized, the value of a gesture sample point can only be a number from 1 to N . By combining X e and Y e with di erent values, we obtain the EndPointSet with size N 2 , composed of (X i , Y i ).
For each value in the EndPointSet, we check the orientation invariance method. If it uses method I, the Y-coordinate of a gesture's rst and last points should be equal. Thus, the rst value of the Y-coordinate, c , should be Y i , the Y-coordinate of the last point. If it uses method II, the Y-coordinate of a gesture's rst point should equal to the mean of all of the gesture's Y-coordinates, which is R × N /2. Then, we use recursive function GRecur () to enumerate all possible gestures with the given end point. Finally, the sum of FS is the size of the full gesture space. if Using Orientation Invariance Method I then else 10:
end if
Algorithm 2 GRecur () is the the core recursive function in GNume(). The inputs of GRecur () keep the same meanings as in GNume(). When L > 1, it means the whole gesture sequence is not generated yet, so we need to keep recurring the function. When L reaches 1, it means the full gesture sequences are generated. We need to check if the generated sequence is a preprocessed gesture. Based on the restriction from the orientation invariance step, the Y coordinate of the gesture's rst point should be equal to either its last point (Y i ) or the mean of the gesture points (R × N /2). From the location invariance step, the mean of the gesture's X-and Y-coordinates, which is X sum /R and Y sum /R, must stay constant and equivalent to the center of a gesture's value range (N /2). If the sequence ful lls the above criteria, the sequence can be regarded as a preprocessed gesture. If not, the sequence should be discarded.
Weak Subspace Analysis
The weak subspace is a subset of passwords that people are more likely to choose. If an attacker has knowledge about people's password preferences, the attacker will use this knowledge to perform more e cient dictionary attacks compared to simple brute force attacks.
In this section, with the full space of gesture passwords as the reference point, we study the weak subspace for gesture passwords. First, we discuss how to determine the "The Authentication Similarity Threshold" in our analysis. Then, we show the procedure for "Weak Subspace Size Estimation". We nd di erent variations of gestures in "Extract Representative Gesture". To estimate the similarities of representative gestures, we need to "Restrict Gesture Searching Region" to improve the search e ciency, and use Monte Carlo method to "Estimate Weak Subspace Size". Finally, we remove the potential double-counting issue by "Check Overlapping Regions".
Authentication Similarity Threshold.
In gesture-based authentication systems, a robust threshold is crucial for recognition performance. For example, if the threshold is set too low, illegitimate users may be able to Algorithm 2 Pseudocode for the recursive function GRecur (L, X i , Y i , X sum , Y sum , c , N , ) in Algorithm 1. This code enumerates the gesture in reverse order of the sequence until the rst point is reached. Then, it will examine if the enumerated sequence is a preprocessed gesture by checking the rotation and location invariance. for X j ∈ X r an e and Y j ∈ Y r an e do 6:
X sum = X sum + X j ;
8: 
15: return 0; // Not a preprocessed gesture 20: end if 21: end if mimic authorized users. Similarly, if the threshold is set too high, authorized users may be rejected due to slight variations in repeating their gesture. Since the optimal threshold varies for each dataset, we did not select the threshold by examining the EER of our datasets as we did when determining the resampling rate and related parameters. Instead, we examined the distribution of the DTW similarity scores among gestures throughout the Dictionary dataset and selected a reasonable value which can authenticate a majority of the legitimate users.
Weak Subspace Size Estimation.
We estimate the size of the weak subspace as follows. First, we manually classify all of the weak subspace gestures by their symbols. Then, we extract several gestures of di erent drawing styles for each particular symbol. For each gesture of a particular drawing style under a speci c symbol, we estimate the total number of similar gestures of it that have similarities less than the authentication threshold. The sum of all total numbers of the similar gestures of each drawing style for each particular symbol will form the size of the weak subspace. Figure 4 shows the procedure. Generally, there are four steps: 1) Extract representative gestures; 2) Restrict gesture searching region; 3) Estimate weak subspace size; and 4) Check overlapping regions.
Extract Representative Gestures.
The reason for extracting representative gestures is that gestures for one symbol are not evenly distributed. For example, given a symbolic gesture, there could be ten gestures of one user's drawing style and twenty gestures of another user's style. In our weak subspace analysis, we should treat the two drawing styles from two people equally. Thus, we merge the gestures where the DTW distance is close and extract representative gestures.
First, we manually classify the gestures in Dictionary dataset by the di erent symbols. Then, for gestures from a speci c symbol, we cluster the gestures by K-means [19, 21] and evaluate the clustering result through Fig. 4 . The procedure to estimate sizes of the weak subspace based on data from Dictionary dataset.
Step 1 is Extract Representative Gestures, which uses K-means and Silhoue e value to extract representatives for gestures of each symbol;
Step 2 is Restrict Search Region, which finds Sakoe-Chiba bands for each representative gesture; Step 3 is Weak Subspace Estimation, which is accomplished by Monte-Carlo simulation; Step 4 is Check Overlapping Regions, which removes potential overlaps between representative gestures' Sakoe-Chiba bands. the Silhouette value [29] . Speci cally, we start K-means at K = 2 and send the clustering result to be evaluated by the Silhouette. Silhouette value measures how similar a gesture is to its own cluster compared to the other clusters [29] . Thus, we can nd the optimal value of K for gestures inside a speci c symbol. Finally, it outputs the centroids of K gesture clusters of all gestures under one symbol as the K representative gestures.
Restrict Gesture Searching Region.
To estimate the size of weak subspace based on representative gestures for a speci c symbol, we need to nd the number of similar gestures for each representative gesture.
We use the Sakoe-Chiba band of one representative gesture to restrict the searching region and nd out similar gestures for the representative. With the Sakoe-Chiba band, which restricts the upper and lower band of the search region, we can calculate the size of theoretically possible gestures, S th .
Estimate Weak Subspace Size.
Even with the Sakoe-Chiba band restriction, there are still millions of possible gestures around one representative gesture. It is too expensive to compute the similarities of all of the representative gestures. Thus, we use a Monte Carlo method as an alternative estimation approach for this situation. First, we randomly generate N gestures within the Sakoe-Chiba band of a speci c representative gesture. Speci cally, we randomly generate the rst gesture sample point and randomly generate the following points under the upper and lower bounds of Sakoe-Chiba band. Then, we measure the DTW distance, D, between the generated gestures and the representative gesture, and compare D to the authentication threshold T . If D > T , it means the gesture is not similar to the representative. If D < T , the gesture could be regarded as a similar gesture to the representative. We count the number M of similar gestures for the representative. Finally, we estimate the size of the weak subspace for one representative gesture by combining the ratio M/N and the theoretical size S th of possible gestures within the Sakoe-Chiba band; this is M/N × S th .
By summation of the K representative gestures' weak subspace sizes for one speci c symbol, we get the weak subspace size for a gesture symbol, S i . Lastly, by adding the P classes of weak subspace sizes of di erent symbols, we calculate the nal size of weak subspace S f inal for gesture passwords.
3.4.6 Check Overlapping Regions. We use the Sakoe-Chiba band, which is an area around one gesture, to restrict the searching region for similar gestures for a single representative gesture. If the Sakoe-Chiba bands of two extracted representative gestures overlap, there is a possibility that the gestures in the overlap region could be double-counted by the two representative gestures as weak subspace gestures.
There are two types of overlaps between two representative gestures' bounds: (1) Partial Overlap, shown in the left of Figure 5 , is when the bounds of Rep.1 and Rep.2 partially cross over; (2) Full Overlap, shown in the right of Figure 5 , means that the bounds of Rep.1, fully fall into the area of the bounds of Rep.2.
We pairwise checked the representatives gestures' bands to examine whether there are any overlaps between them. We found that even among the representative gestures of the same symbol, there are no overlaps among the representative's bounds.
In summary, we have the estimated the size of the weak subspace for each gesture group and the total size of the weak subspace following the four steps above. Although we used DTW to measure the similarity between gestures, it can be easily extended to other time sequence similarity measurements, the only two di erences are the similarity measurement in K-means and the authentication threshold T . The general steps are the same.
Guessability Analysis
We present our attack method based on the dictionary of the gestures in the weak subspace. We also present a baseline brute-force attack method, which we will use for comparison.
3.5.1 Dictionary A ack Method. The order of our attack is based on the order of total weak subspace gestures in each group. The more weak subspace gestures in a group makes it more likely that the gesture group will be selected. We select a number of weak gestures in the gesture groups instead of the number in a particular gesture pattern as the index for the attack order. The reason is that since the size of the Dictionary dataset is relatively small, there is a limited number of gestures of a speci c symbol meaning.
Dictionary Attack Gesture Generation Method. Generating a dictionary attack gesture uses the same process shown in Figure 4 . The speci c steps are: 1: The attacker selects a representative gesture in a gesture group and calculates its Sakoe-Chiba band. As a reminder, a representative gesture is extracted using K-means with a Silhouette value. 2: Randomly generate an attack gesture under the representative gesture's Sakoe-Chiba band. 3: Measure the similarity between the attack gesture and all of the target gestures under attack. If the similarity is under the authentication threshold, the corresponding gesture password is guessed correctly (cracked). 4: Repeat the above steps for another guess.
Benchmark:
Brute Force A ack Method. Previous work has shown how, for Draw-A-Secret (DAS) graphical passwords, the weak subspace can be enumerated by using symmetric features and a small number of distinct strokes [16] . Based on prior ndings from DAS [40] and Pass-Go [35] graphical passwords, we extended these ideas for our baseline brute force cracking attack. We de ne the following heuristics: (1) people are more likely to create symmetric horizontal or vertical axes at or near the middle of a screen; (2) people tend to choose small number of distinct strokes. The small number of distinct strokes assumed for graphical passwords is not applicable to the multistroke case for gesture passwords since we connect a multistroke gesture end-to-end in the preprocessing procedure. As a result, both unistroke and multistroke symmetric gestures should be globally symmetric. Figure 6 (a) shows an example of one type of central symmetric axis.
Brute Force Attack Gesture Generation Method. The speci c steps for the attack are as follows: 1: Randomly generate the eight X-and Y-coordinates of the rst half of the gesture in the entire space. 2: Randomly select the gesture's symmetric axis: vertical or horizontal. Table 3 . The sizes of the weak subspaces for free-form gestures. "Weak Gesture #" is the number of gestures that people selected as passwords. Compared to the size of the full gesture space (about 109 bits), the weak subspace (about 82 bits) is much smaller. Furthermore, the Geometric Shape group occupies the largest part of the total weak subspace size while Digits group has the smallest weak subspace size. under the authentication threshold, the corresponding gesture password is cracked. Figure 6 (b) shows that the symmetric axis does not need to be located at exactly the middle point of the gesture sequence. Although a symmetric axis in the rightmost of Figure 6 is not located at the midpoint of the gesture sequence, its gesture shape is still symmetric and it still should be considered as a symmetric gesture. As a reminder, we resampled all gestures to 16 points in preprocessing so the attacking method only needs to generate 16 points.
Group

RESULTS
In this section, we rst present the sizes of full gesture space and weak subspaces. Then, we show the cracking results of the dictionary attack and the brute force attack on Test dataset (General) and Test dataset (Weak).
Sizes of Full Space and Weak Subspace of Gesture Passwords
By running Algorithm 1, we computed the size of the full theoretical gesture password spaces: 109.0 bits for orientation method I and 109.1 bits for orientation method II. Since the di erence between the full space sizes for the two orientation methods is small, 109.0 bits vs. 109.1 bits, we conclude the variability in choosing either orientation method in gesture has little e ect on the size of the space. Table 3 shows the size of the weak subspace for two di erent orientation invariance methods based on our group clustering. The sizes of the weak subspace (both about 82 bits) are much smaller than the full space (both about 109 bits).
We found that the Geometric Shape group has the largest weak subspace and the Digit group has the smallest weak subspace. The larger the size of the subspace, the harder it is to crack it. We can predict that passwords in the Digits group are the easiest to crack while the passwords in the Geometric Shape group are the most di cult to crack among the seven groups.
By comparing the weak subspace size between the two orientation invariance methods, we found that the di erence between the methods has a limited e ect on the size of the weak subspace. Fig. 7 . Cracking results for the dictionary and brute force a acks against free-form gestures (Test (General)) and specifically collected weak subspace gestures (Test (Weak)). For Test (General), by comparing the cracking rates, we find that our dictionary a ack is more e icient cracking gestures compared to a brute force a ack. The orientation invariance method I is more vulnerable to a acks than method II. For Test (Weak), a comparison between our dictionary and brute force a acks is meaningless since the dataset is specifically targeted for testing the dictionary set of weak subspace gestures.
Cracking Evaluation on Free-Form Gestures
To examine the performance of the dictionary attack and the brute force attack, we perform both attacks on gestures in Test dataset (General), which consists of free-form unistroke and multistroke gestures that users selected as their passwords. Figure 7 shows the cracking results of the two attacks based on the two orientation invariance methods (marked as Test (General)). Figure 7 shows that our dictionary attack is more e cient than the brute force attack. With both orientation methods, the dictionary attack cracked 35.78 percentage points more unistroke gestures and 19.27 percentage points more multistroke gestures than the brute-force attack. It is interesting that the di erence between the two orientation methods does not in uence di erent cracking rates between the attacking methods. By inspection, there does not appear to be a correlation between the gestures cracked under either orientation method and the the type of attack method.
Between Di erent A acking Methods.
The dictionary attack targets gestures inside the weak subspace, while the brute-force attack targets gestures with symmetric features. By checking the gestures with the particularly targeted features alone, the dictionary attack is more e cient at cracking weak subspace gestures compared to the brute-force attack cracking symmetric gestures. Figure 7 shows that the dictionary attack cracked 47.71% of unistroke gestures, which means 52 out of 109 gestures were cracked. Table 1 shows there are totally 78 weak subspace unistroke gestures in the Test dataset (General), so we nd that 66.67% of weak subspace unistroke gestures were cracked. Similarly, the brute-force attack cracked 11.93% of unistroke gestures, that is 13 out of 109 unistroke gestures. Since there are 36 unistroke symmetric gestures in Test dataset (General), it means 36.11% of unistroke symmetric gestures were cracked. Therefore, the dictionary attack is more e cient at cracking weak subspace gestures than the brute force attack at cracking symmetric gestures. Figure 7 shows that gestures with orientation invariance method II resists attacks better than method I. Both dictionary and brute force attacks cracked 11.01 percentage points more unistroke gestures and 7.34 percentage points more multistroke gestures with orientation method I than method II. It happens again that the di erence between the two attacking methods does not in uence the cracking rates between two orientation methods. By checking the cracked gestures, we still did not nd any relationships between the orientation methods and attack methods. To conclude, the selection of the orientation invariance method has an e ect on the gesture's ability to resist attacks.
Between Di erent Orientation Invariance Methods.
4.2.3
Between Di erent Gesture Types. As Figure 7 shows, multistroke gestures resist dictionary attacks better than unistroke gestures. With both orientation methods, there are more than 10 percentage points of unistroke gestures that were cracked than multistroke gestures.
Under brute-force attack, there is no obvious di erence between cracking rates for unistroke and multistroke gestures. Additionally, the absolute numbers of cracked unistroke and multistroke gestures are small. We cannot conclude that multistroke gestures are weaker than unistroke gesture on resisting brute-force attacks.
Note on Computational
Limitations. The computational cost of measuring the similarity between gestures is a crucial limiting factor in our test. Unlike text passwords presented in previous work [6, 14, 39] , where checking if a password is right or wrong is near instant, gesture passwords requires dynamically searching for the DTW distance. The computational complexity for text password matching is O(N ) and for gesture matching is O(N 2 ), with N being the password length. We spent two weeks performing 10 9 attacks against 3488 gestures, that is 218 gestures in Test dataset 1 and 3270 gestures in Test dataset 2. Assuming we want to attack the same amount of text and gesture password with the same length, the gesture password attack needs to spend 3488N 2 /N ≈ 10 3 N times more computation than text passwords. However, text based password systems can use approaches such as scrypt [27] to slow down the veri cation process.
Crack Evaluation on Weak Subspace Gestures
The above results show that the dictionary attack outperforms the brute force attack. To examine the e ectiveness of our dictionary attacks on cracking speci cally weak subspace gestures, we perform the dictionary attack on Test dataset (Weak), which contains only weak subspace gestures that were intentionally collected and covered by our gesture dictionary. Figure 7 shows the cracking result for dictionary and brute force attacks on weak subspace gestures in Test dataset (Weak) based on the two orientation invariance methods. The dictionary attack had a 55.9% cracking rate with orientation method I and 37.19% cracking rate with method II. The brute force attack had 1.28% and 0.76% cracking rate for the two orientation methods.
We observe the cracking rates using dictionary attacks in Test dataset (Weak) (55.9% and 37.19%) is higher than that rates in Test dataset (General) (47.71% and 36.70%). The reason is that Test dataset (Weak) intentionally contains only the weak subspace gestures, while Test dataset (General) contains both weak subspace gestures and other freely created gestures. This means that Test dataset (Weak) performance is by default biased towards favoring the dictionary attack. Therefore, conclusions about the performance of the brute-force attack compared to the dictionary attack should be limited to the Test dataset (General). Figure 8 shows the details of cracked gestures in Test dataset (Weak). The Digit gesture group is the most easily cracked while the Special Character gesture group is the most resistant. As Figure 8 shows, only 21.37% of Digit gestures can resist dictionary attacks. A possible reason is that Digit group has the smallest weak subspace (about 67 bits) in Table 3 . The principal reason, however, is that there is not much observed variation in the way people perform gestures in the Digit group. In contrast, 52.99% of special character group gestures are not cracked by dictionary attacks. This can be explained by its large weak subspace size (about 75 bits) and smallest number in Table 3 . The larger weak subspace size makes gestures more di cult to be cracked and the smaller number of weak gestures prevents the attack dictionary from covering all possible variations of the way people draw certain gestures. Fig. 8 . Categories of cracked gestures with di erent orientation invariance methods in Test dataset (Weak). The Special character group is the strongest and Digit group is the weakest on resisting the dictionary a acks.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have presented the rst paper on performing guessing attacks for gesture passwords. We developed methodology for performing guessing attacks, showed how to enumerate the size of both the full and weak subspaces for gesture passwords, identi ed and categorized a list of most commonly used gestures from published work on gesture passwords, and recruited participants to obtain additional data for testing our method. We showed guessing attacks against gesture passwords by creating a generalizable method based on how gestures are recognized. We extended this attack method for a dictionary attack based on common gestures as well as contributed a brute force attack based on symmetric features to use as a benchmark measurement.
Our dictionary attack method, when tested on a newly collected dataset from 109 participants, vastly outperformed the brute force attack. For unistroke gestures, this was a di erence of 35.78 percentage points with Orientation Method I and a di erence of 22.94 percentage points with Orientation Method II. Figure 7 shows that these types of gaps persist not matter whether unistroke, multistroke, or Orientation Method is considered: dictionary attacks are consistently better and always by double-digit percentages.
The takeaway from this is similarly clear, and it is a lesson learned in research on cracking text passwords as well: dictionary attacks informed by using the most common passwords inside of a weak subspace generates more successful attacks than a random brute-force guess. The disadvantage of the dictionary attack is also its strength: by targeting on the most common gestures it cannot crack gestures that are not covered by the weak subspace dictionary. Thus, it needs a large variety of free-form gestures to expand coverage of the weak subspace dictionary. In contrast, the brute force attack method does not need gesture samples in advance.
The size of the full space for gesture passwords is very large, despite the restrictions on the space imposed by our methodology. Table 3 shows that, given the propensity of users to select gesture passwords from the groupings we identi ed, the size of the full space is reduced down to 82.1 bits for Orientation Method I and 81.7 bits for Orientation Method II. Although there is a decline of over 20 bits from the full space size (109 bits) to the weak subspace size (82 bits), both the full space and weak subspace are of an impressive size. In spite of the degree of available gestures to choose from, even in an 80-bit large subspace, participants are still being routinely cracked at rates over 45%.
There is a sense that the more gestures that appear in Dictionary dataset, the larger the weak subspace size might be. As Table 2 shows, the distribution of weak set groups of Dictionary dataset and Test dataset are similar -independent of the size of each set. Currently, we computed a 82 bits weak subspace based on 407 weak gestures. Assuming we collected 100 times more gestures (40700 gestures), the 88.6 bit size would not change since we would need to assume a linear rise in the number of weak gestures that appear as well. The sizes of the weak subspaces are still much smaller than the full space size (about 109 bits), irrespective of the number of gestures. Therefore, we conclude that the larger size of Dictionary dataset may increase the size of weak subspace, but it does not have a signi cant in uence on the relationship among the gesture groups in the weak set. The reason is that since the relative distribution of weak set groups are constant, the analysis of the weak subspace is also constant. Even with 100 times more gestures, the size of the weak subspace cannot enlarge 100 times because the weak subspace gestures are obtained by analyzing symbols with shared meanings (Shapes, Letters). Thus, the size of our Dictionary dataset is large enough to estimate the size of the weak subspace and output reliable results.
One possibility is that the sample size is skewing the results. However, this should work in the opposite direction: since we only have low numbers of gesture passwords, and given the space is so large, it should take many more examples of gesture passwords before (ideally) seeing a collision between two users independently sampling the password distribution. Instead, given the large space, we are seeing frequent repetitions and overlap between independently and separately collected works of published gesture passwords, with our newly-collected data being cracked at a rate of 47.71%. Users are selecting gestures with meaning behind them likely because they are easier to remember and choose on-the-spot as a password. This selection bias has led to weak subspaces, however. One way to resist dictionary attacks for gesture passwords would be to advise participants to use combinations of symbols. Unlike in text passwords, even simple combinations of symbols as a gesture password should make cracking far more di cult given the large increase in computational expense. The need to address user choice for creating gestures is clear [25] . An alternative is to encourage, perhaps through policies, a methodology for generating gesture passwords that make them more random-appearing.
Each preprocessing step reduces the size of the password space. By design, that is their purpose -by reducing the total number of possibilities the intention is to make it easier for recognizers to distinguish similar gestures. This increases the likelihood of misinterpreting two gestures intended to be di erent as being the same. However, without preprocessing the space is much larger but the e ect is that matching two gestures that are meant to be similar is far more di cult. It is easy to see why the size of the password space would be larger, though. A recognizer that does not allow location to change, for example, would distinguish two circles drawn at di erent corners of the screen to likely be di erent despite the users intentions. As a result, gestures that are too far away are considered distinct. For example, a circle that would be worth only one gesture in our preprocessed space could be worth as much as four gestures (one for each corner of the screen) in an unprocessed space. The downside is that this increases user frustrations. All of these points are in tension: the size of the password space, the recognizer e ciency, and usability of the system. Care has to be taken to balance all three.
Our experiment is conducted in the laboratory, which may a ect the distribution of user-chosen gesture passwords [50] . There has not been any evidence so far of a clear di erence between the distributions of laboratory and eld gesture passwords [50] . As such, we cannot estimate its in uence on the cracking performance.
Multistroke gestures are better than unistroke gestures at resisting cracking attempts, with the highest multistroke dictionary attack at 33.03%. The reason for this lies in the recognizer's construction of multistroke gestures. Multistroke gestures have disparate strokes connected together to form a single gesture, and these variances in drawing multiple strokes followed by connections make it more di cult to account for.
We do not examine guessing attacks or brute force attacks against gesture passwords drawn with multiple ngers (multitouch). The datasets we obtained do not have a large number of samples for these multitouch passwords. This limits our ability to make generalizations about the weak subspace groups. Previous work [34] showed biases in the distribution towards repeating unitouch gures with multiple ngers in the multitouch case. In this respect, an extension to analyze multitouch could be relatively simple. The computations are also far more expensive for the multitouch case. Multitouch gestures would be important further work to study.
In conclusion, we have presented the rst paper on realistic guessing attacks against free-form gesture passwords. We believe our work is a critical step towards evaluating the security of gesture passwords. Additional material, including source code and datasets can be found at http://securegestures.org.
